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University of Essex
This research focuses on a positive, and previously largely unknown, implication of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping: better
environmental quality. While maintaining international peace and security remains the main goal of peacekeeping operations,
we contend that they can also be linked to environmentally friendly outcomes. Mission mandates and UN policies increasingly
comprise actions that potentially promote environmental quality. At the same time, positive side effects on the environment
materialize due to the cooperation with and activities of other UN bodies. The empirical analyses, also correcting for the
likely non-random assignment of peace missions and employing several alternative outcome measures, suggest that UN peace
missions are indeed substantively associated with better environmental quality. This research has important implications for
our understanding of peacekeeping operations, and it contributes to the literatures on the (unintended) consequences of
peacekeeping as well as environmental politics.
Esta investigación se centra en una repercusión positiva, que antes prácticamente se desconocía, del mantenimiento de la
paz de las Naciones Unidas: una mejor calidad ambiental. Si bien preservar la paz y la seguridad internacionales continúa
siendo el objetivo principal de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz, sostenemos que también pueden relacionarse con
resultados ecológicos. Cada vez más, los mandatos de las misiones y las políticas de las Naciones Unidas incluyen medidas que
promueven potencialmente la calidad ambiental. Al mismo tiempo, los efectos secundarios positivos en el medioambiente
se materializan gracias a las actividades de otros órganos de las Naciones Unidas y la cooperación con ellos. Los análisis
empáricos, que también corrigen la probable asignación no aleatoria de las misiones de paz y emplean varias mediciones
de resultados alternativos, sugieren que las misiones de paz de las Naciones Unidas ciertamente se relacionan de manera
considerable con una mejor calidad ambiental. Esta investigación tiene repercusiones importantes para nuestro conocimiento
de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz, y contribuye a la bibliografía sobre las consecuencias (no intencionadas) de
la preservación de la paz y de las políticas ambientales.
Cette recherche se concentre sur une implication positive, et précédemment en grande partie inconnue, du maintien de la
paix de l’ONU : une amélioration de la qualité environnementale. Bien que le maintien international de la paix et de la
sécurité reste le principal objectif des opérations de maintien de la paix, nous soutenons qu’elles peuvent également être
associées à des résultats ècologiques. Les mandats de mission et les politiques de l’ONU incluent de plus en plus des actions
pouvant potentiellement promouvoir la qualité environnementale. Dans le même temps, des effets secondaires positifs sur
l’environnement se matérialisent en raison de la coopération avec d’autres organes de l’ONU et des activités qu’ils entrepren-
nent. Les analyses empiriques, qui réajustent également l’affectation probablement non aléatoire des missions de paix et ont
recours à plusieurs mesures alternatives des résultats, suggèrent que les missions de paix de l’ONU sont effectivement sub-
stantiellement associées à une meilleure qualité environnementale. Cette recherche a d’importantes implications pour notre
compréhension des opérations de maintien de la paix et contribue aux littératures portant sur les conséquences (imprévues)
du maintien de la paix ainsi que sur les politiques environnementales.
Introduction
More than seventy United Nations (UN) peacekeeping op-
erations (PKOs) have been established in conflict or post-
conflict contexts since the first mission in 1948, making
peacekeeping a popular instrument to restore and main-
tain international peace and security. Given this main goal
of UN PKOs, interventions are commonly considered as ef-
fective if violence and conflict are lowered at several lev-
els. For example, fewer battle-related deaths (e.g., Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Bove and Ruggeri 2019), a
better protection of civilians (e.g., Kathman and Wood 2011;
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Bove and Ruggeri
2016; Haass and Ansorg 2018; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson
2019), preventing conflicts from spreading across bor-
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ders and recurring (e.g., Fortna 2004; Gilligan and
Sergenti 2008; Beardsley 2011; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård
2019), or the transformation to a stable post-conflict en-
vironment (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Howard 2008;
Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2012; Autesserre 2014) are all seen
as benchmarks for effective peacekeeping. Indeed, there is
strong and robust evidence that peacekeeping “works,” and
that PKOs do deliver by meeting the main goals that have
led to the establishment of a mission in the first place.
Peacekeeping has evolved over the past few decades from
“traditional” to multidimensional missions or “peacebuild-
ing” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Da Costa and Karlsrud
2012). These “new” interventions are based on more com-
plex and far-reaching mandates that “include elements of
longer-term post-conflict economic, social, and political de-
velopment” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 285). Such “inte-
grated missions” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 285) still pursue
peace and security promotion as the primary goals, but also
encompass a series of non-military elements pertaining to,
among others, electoral assistance, socio-economic develop-
ment, or even cultural activities. As a result, next to analyz-
ing PKOs’ impact on their primary mission targets of peace
and security, the literature has begun to study other, less ob-
vious implications and consequences of peacekeepers. That
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is, scholars increasingly seek to shed light on how PKOs
affect economic, political, and social development more
generally and besides the narrow focus on military tasks
and the absence of violence (for an overview, see, e.g., Di
Salvatore 2019). Peace missions, for instance, can influence
national, local, and even household economic well-being,
facilitating economic growth or agricultural production un-
der some conditions (Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović 2009;
Hoeffler, Ijaz, and Von Billerbeck 2011; Caruso et al. 2017;
Bove, Di Salvatore, and Elia 2021). Di Salvatore (2019) re-
ports that although lowering criminal activity is not always
included in mission mandates, PKOs can have unintended
consequences: while regular troops actually induce a higher
level of crime, UN police troops have the opposite effect.
Moreover, Belgioioso, Di Salvatore, and Pinckney (2021)
find that peace missions, especially those comprising con-
tributing states with an active civil society, are likely to be
linked to peaceful protests in post-conflict societies. Gizelis
and Cao (2020) argue that peacekeepers promote maternal
health as well as women’s access to medical services and edu-
cation. Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2020) provide an overview
of possible implications of PKOs on a variety of outcomes
including gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the level
of democracy, state authority, and women’s conditions (see
also Steinert and Grimm 2015). Finally, Kim (2017) con-
tends that PKOs may induce that governments are more re-
sponsive to citizen needs, which can improve health condi-
tions and resources for reconstruction.
Our research adds to these and related studies on the
(side) effects of peacekeeping missions other than the pri-
mary goal of peace by examining a previously largely un-
known implication that PKOs can have: improved environ-
mental quality. Environmental quality, broadly defined, “is
a measure of the condition of an environment relative to
the requirements of one or more species and/or to any hu-
man need or purpose” (Johnson et al. 1997, 586). Hence,
the concept captures the properties and state of the en-
vironment, as they affect human beings or other organ-
isms and, in turn, are influenced by them (see also Scruggs
2003; Jahn 1998). This includes the degree of human bur-
den on nature: improving environmental quality thus low-
ers the human impact on and increases the sustainabil-
ity of the ecosystem. A “better” environmental quality may
then refer to lower levels of pollution in, e.g., air, soil, and
water—environmental degradation, i.e., “any change or dis-
turbance to the environment perceived to be deleterious”
(Johnson et al. 1997, 584) is reduced (Scruggs 1999; Jahn
2016). The focus of this study is on PKOs improving envi-
ronmental quality in their host countries and, as we detail
below, water quality.1 The main purpose of any peace mis-
sion since the 1940s has not been the promotion of envi-
ronmental outcomes, but we argue that UN missions may
nonetheless be potentially linked to better environmental
quality in assigned countries. At least three avenues sug-
gest that this direct effect exists. First, several mandates now
comprise principles that potentially promote environmen-
tal quality and facilitate sustainability directly. As Maertens
(2019, 1) contends, “multiple transformations in terms of
norms and practices resulted,” which likely not only lower
the environmental footprint of PKOs as such, but also im-
prove environmental quality at large. Second, UN peace mis-
sions increasingly cooperate with and benefit from the activ-
1 Johnson et al. (1997, 589) provide an extensive definition of water quality:
“levels of water quality expected to render a body of water suitable for its des-
ignated use. Criteria are based on specific levels of pollutants that would make
the water harmful if used for drinking, swimming, farming, fish production, or
industrial uses.”
ities of other UN bodies that have expertise in environmen-
tal protection, most importantly the UN Environment Pro-
gram (UNEP). Third, the UN incorporated environmental-
friendly policies relevant for PKOs at least since the
early 2000s, most recently via its “Declaration of Shared
Commitments.”2
The empirical analysis employs quantitative data on UN
PKOs in the post-Cold War era. Regression models compris-
ing a series of controls, unit and year fixed effects, and while
accounting for the likely non-random assignment of PKOs
to conflicts, do highlight that UN peace missions are indeed
linked to host nations’ better environmental performance.
Based on the criteria for environmental-performance mea-
sures in Jahn (2016) and considering that PKOs must at
least principally have the possibility to affect such an out-
come (see also Bernauer and Koubi 2009), we capture en-
vironmental quality with data on improving water sources
and sanitation from Kyu et al. (2018). The robustness of this
finding is explored via a series of changes in research-design
specifications, including different outcome variables for en-
vironmental quality.
Our research and its core result make a number of key
contributions to several strands of the literature. First, we
add to the peacekeeping literature by examining another,
mostly unknown, implication of PKOs. The direct and in-
tended effects of PKOs with regard to addressing peace and
security are well studied (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000;
Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Howard 2008;
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Bove and
Ruggeri 2016, 2019; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019).
However, only recently have scholars begun to explore the
externalities of PKOs. By focusing on environmental quality,
we shed light on another implication of PKOs other than the
direct promotion of peace as such.
Second, we contribute to the literature on environmen-
tal politics and outcomes (e.g., Shafik 1994; Scruggs 1999;
York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003; Caviglia-Harris, Chambers, and
Kahn 2009; Farzin and Bond 2006; Ward 2008; Bernauer
and Koubi 2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Jahn 2016;
Böhmelt, Vaziri, and Ward 2018). Previous works focus on
factors like income, economic growth, or political regime
type. PKOs have not been considered as a decisive factor in
promoting environmental quality, which is understandable
given that mission mandates are primarily conflict-related
and evaluations of PKO effectiveness mostly concentrate on
the degree of political violence. Hence, earlier research has
overlooked the influence of UN peace interventions and we
address this shortcoming theoretically and empirically in a
systematic fashion. What is more, we extend the literature
on “green peacekeepers” (e.g., Maertens and Shoshan 2018;
Maertens 2019) by demonstrating that UN peace missions
can actually affect the environmental performance of host
countries at large.
Finally, there is the emerging scholarship on the relation-
ship between environmental politics and peace-and-conflict
studies (see, e.g., Ide and Detges 2018; Ide 2019; Ide and
Tubi 2020; Ide et al. 2021). It has been argued, for in-
stance, that conflict and political violence can be overcome
by cooperation over environmental issues—“environmental
peacebuilding” (Conca et al. 2002; Ide and Detges 2018;
Ide 2019; Ide and Tubi 2020; Ide 2020; Ide et al. 2021).
Previous research also points to a relationship between cli-
mate change and conflict (Nordås, and Gleditsch 2007;
Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2014; Theisen, Gleditsch, and







/isq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/isq/sqab051/6309158 by guest on 01 July 2021
ZO R Z E TA BA K A K I A N D TO B I A S BÖ H M E LT 3
Buhaug 2013; Buhaug et al. 2014), even if only indirectly
and potentially moderated by mitigation and adaptation
measures (Mach et al. 2019; Pearson and Newman 2019).3
Our finding that PKOs improve environmental quality po-
tentially adds to this debate. UN interventions may facil-
itate cooperation directly, and also affect conflict risk as
peacekeepers’ activities relate to climate-change mitigation
and adaptation. Moreover, PKOs seem to increasingly re-
spond to conflict precipitated by climatic changes, also as
preventive deployments (Diehl 2018).4 When subscribing
to these avenues, peacekeepers’ influence is, in fact, more
substantive and far-reaching than ever anticipated—given,
of course, that we can link peace missions to better environ-
mental quality. This research is one of the first to provide
this evidence.
How UN Peacekeeping Can Promote
Environmental Quality
The starting point of our argument is the change in the
nature of PKOs and their mandates, particularly after the
end of the Cold War (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006;
Fortna and Howard 2008; Howard 2008). UN peace mis-
sions have become more complex and ambitious in estab-
lishing and maintaining peace, with the latter remaining the
core aims of such interventions, of course (see Fetherston
2000; Greig and Diehl 2005). Increasing complexity went
hand in hand with a transition to peacebuilding interven-
tions and altered mandates, which not only became more
robust over time, but also increasingly sought to address less
traditional aspects of PKOs such as economic growth, so-
cial development, and—as it is the focus of our research—
environmental issues and outcomes (see also Diehl 2018).
The multidimensional mandates of “integrated missions”
(Fortna and Howard 2008, 285) move beyond peace de-
fined as the absence of overt violence, since they seek to
create a context where civilians can live a “normal” life,
thereby addressing multiple dimensions not linked to the
more traditional military focus of PKOs (Barnett, Fang, and
Zürcher 2014). UN missions are thus more and more de-
signed and employed to keep and make peace at multiple
levels, potentially including the environment as well. And
indeed, primarily since the early 2000s (see Maertens 2019;
Ide et al. 2021), UN PKOs are now aware of the environmen-
tal challenges they could encounter and the environmental
footprint missions might cause (Krampe 2017; Krampe and
Gignoux 2018; Maertens 2019; Ide 2020). We claim that,
in turn, this has paved the way to at least three avenues
that associate UN peace missions with better environmen-
tal quality in their host countries: in particular, mandates of
PKOs and, generally, UN policies such as the “Declaration
of Shared Commitments” incorporate principles and norm
prescriptions that likely promote environmental quality for
the host country at large (see also Krampe 2017; Krampe
and Gignoux 2018; Maertens 2019). In addition, peacekeep-
ers have fostered the cooperation with and input from other
UN bodies that have expertise in environmental politics.
First, mandates are the principal legal framework legit-
imizing PKOs and providing them with guidelines on what
to do on the ground. The activities of peacekeepers are,
therefore, significantly influenced by the underlying man-
date, since missions seek to implement in host nations what
their mandates formulate as goals. Especially since the early
2000s (Maertens 2019), UN peace mission mandates now
3 See also online: https://tinyurl.com/y6w4luap.
4 See also online: https://tinyurl.com/ybammwbk.
refer to a series of activities that directly address environ-
mental concerns and can promote its quality in the host
country. Among others, these activities include the provi-
sion of agricultural land as part of the reintegration pro-
cess, the building of water-related infrastructure to address
grievances and support livelihoods, and the reduction of
illegal resource extraction that might finance further vio-
lence (Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols 2016). If peacekeepers
do indeed implement such “green goals” of their mandates
effectively, the environmental quality in the host country
should improve. There is rich anecdotal evidence illustrat-
ing this first avenue. For example, while the primary goal of
the UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been the protec-
tion of civilians, its mandate was more multidimensional and
organized around four areas: information management and
analysis, training and capacity-building, natural resources
and the environment, and the implementation of quick im-
pact projects (QIPs).5 Particularly the latter two areas also
address environmental quality. For example, UNAMID has
been implementing more than 500 QIPs and community-
based labor-intensive projects on, among others, water, san-
itation, and the sustainable exploitation of forest resources
since 2007.6 Also, consider the extension of the mandate of
the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic, where the UN recognizes
“the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes
and natural disasters [...].” Likewise, the Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been training
military, police, and civilian personnel as part of their envi-
ronmental action plan “to observe the management of solid
and dangerous waste, energy, water, wastewater, flora and
fauna, as well as the protection of historical and cultural
sites.”7 And there is the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) with its mandate referring to the “effective imple-
mentation of the Forestry Reform Law,” encouraging “UN-
MIL to continue its joint patrols with the Forestry Develop-
ment Authority,” or emphasizing that UNMIL should “assist
the transitional government in restoring proper administra-
tion of natural resources.”
Second, among other UN officials, the Secretary-General,
António Guterres, has highlighted the importance of en-
vironmental matters when stating that protecting the envi-
ronment is a preventive measure against conflict triggered
by competition over scarce natural resources. He adds that
“protecting our environment is critical to the founding goals
of the United Nations to prevent war and sustain peace.”8
Against this background, other UN bodies such as (and pri-
marily) the UNEP have been stressing the need to put the
environment at the center of preventing and resolving con-
flicts (see Jensen and Lonergan 2012). We argue that fos-
tering cooperation with and increasingly using the exper-
tise of these agencies and programs could further enhance
the positive impact of PKOs on the environment. Specifi-
cally, the UNEP complements PKOs’ activities by focusing
on environmental protection and resource management.
UNEP and its partners state, for example, that they sup-
port African countries through “[a]ddressing [...] the en-
vironment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping
process.”9 The UNEP also developed recommendations in
5 Available online at: https://unamid.unmissions.org/.
6 Available online at: https://www.fao.org/gender/projects/detail/en/c/
449355.
7 Available online at: https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/environment.
8 Available online at: https://www.unep.org/annualreport/2016/index.php.
9 Available online at: https://tinyurl.com/u436nm6. As an illustrative case,
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2009,10 which the UN’s International Law Commission for-
mally adopted and the International Committee of the Red
Cross was prompted to update their guidelines on environ-
mental protection during armed conflict. Moreover, the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees started to take into ac-
count the environmental consequences of refugee camps
as of the 1980s (Maertens and Shoshan 2018) and there is
the Environmental Peacebuilding Association,11 which de-
velops, manages, and shares knowledge on environment
conflict and peace, acknowledging the importance of en-
vironmental quality to promote sustainable peace. Making
use of this expertise on environmental matters, formally or
informally, likely improves peacekeepers’ influence on en-
vironmental quality. Consider here, for example, the UN-
AMID that directly refers to cooperation with UNEP in its
mandate. That is, the mandate “[c]ommends the outcome
of the Darfur International Conference on water held in
Khartoum on 27 and 28 June 2011 as a step towards sustain-
able peace, and calls on UNAMID, where consistent with its
mandate, and all other UN agencies in particular UNICEF,
UNDP, UNEP, as well as international actors and donors to
meet their commitments made in that conference.”
Third, general UN policies commit PKOs to
environmental-friendly actions (Diehl 2018) most re-
cently via their “Declaration of Shared Commitments on
UN Peacekeeping Operations.” Issued in September 2018,
Article 23 of this statement of principles claims that the UN
“further commit to sound environmental management by
implementing the United Nations Environmental Policy
for UN field missions, and to support environmentally-
responsible solutions to our operations and mandate
delivery.” Hence, not only do peace missions seek to im-
prove environmental conditions for the host country at
large, but also to reduce their own environmental footprint.
UN peacekeepers acknowledge more and more that large
operations generate a lot of waste or consume a significant
amount of resources in places where these are scarce to
begin with (Maertens 2019). This has triggered a series of
policies to manage environmental issues within missions,
the “Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peace-
keeping Operations” being the latest one in this regard. The
first policy issued, however, was the 2004 “Environmental
Policy for UN Field Missions” and there were other, general
actions and evaluations in the early 2000s (Maertens and
Shoshan 2018, 9). Maertens (2019), examining the envi-
ronmental norms and practices that target the ecological
footprint of UN peacekeeping, concludes that environ-
mental concerns have been translated to actions within UN
PKOs—but also, as we contend, this potentially has an effect
beyond interventions for the host country as such.
When subscribing to the effectiveness of these three av-
enues, i.e., peacekeepers successfully implement and follow
environmental goals of mission mandates, pursue the co-
operation with and benefit from activities as well as input
of other UN bodies, and they adhere to the principles in
general such as the “Declaration of Shared Commitments,”
we expect that environmental quality in countries hosting
peacekeepers improves as a result of PKO activity.
2008) works “with other members of the UN family to assist the govern-
ment of DR Congo in its post-conflict recovery and sustainable development.”
Available online at: https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/disasters-
conflicts/where-we-work/democratic-republic-congo.
10 Available online at: https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/int_law.pdf.
11 Available online at: https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/.
Research Design
Our empirical analysis uses a monadic (country-year) time-
series cross-sectional data set comprising African states that
have seen the outbreak of at least one civil war in 1995–2012.
This sample is based on Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon
(2014) who focus on African countries in civil wars since the
early 1990s (see also Di Salvatore 2019). Data limitations
on peacekeeping troops (discussed below) essentially dic-
tate the end year of the temporal coverage of our analysis.
The focus on civil-war countries allows that peacekeeping
was at least a possibility and we exclude states that have not
seen domestic warfare at all in the period of study. This ap-
proach, and after accounting for missing values, limits the
analysis to seventeen African states and has two important
implications. On one hand, (conflict) states in other regions
of the world are not included. On the other hand, however,
the African focus as well as concentrating on states in con-
flict or thereafter ensure that we have a set of countries that
are rather similar in several aspects at the macro level, which
may affect environmental outcomes. Only analyzing the sev-
enteen states outlined in figure 1 increases the chances that
our sample represents the population we wish to describe.
The full model with controls is based on 200 observations
(country-years).
For the dependent variable, we require a proxy for envi-
ronmental quality. In line with our broad definition of this
concept, the literature offers and discusses several options
(e.g., Ward 2006; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Caviglia-Harris,
Chambers, and Kahn 2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013;
Cao and Ward 2015; Böhmelt, Vaziri, and Ward 2018). While
“no single measure is ideal for all purposes” (Böhmelt,
Vaziri, and Ward 2018, 483), there are essential criteria for
any environmental-quality indicator (Jahn 2016, 91ff): the
variable is at the outcome level, human activity and polit-
ical action can influence it, it refers to an obvious prob-
lem and can be subject to government regulations, there
are available abatement technologies for implementation
of the regulations, and data are available for a large set of
countries and comparable over time (see also Bernauer and
Koubi 2009, 1358). The main results presented below em-
ploy a variable capturing water quality: an item on the num-
ber of age-standardized disability-adjusted life-years lost per
100,000 persons (DALY rate) due to unsafe water sources
and sanitation (Kyu et al. 2018). That is, we focus on one as-
pect of environmental quality that meets the requirements
outlined above and that can, at least in principle, be influ-
enced by PKO deployments. Recall, for instance, that the
building of water-related infrastructure has become a key ac-
tivity of many peacekeeping interventions (Bruch, Muffett,
and Nichols 2016). This has the potential to shape safe water
access and sanitation. Moreover, Johnson et al. (1997) and
Jahn (2016) stress that water pollution is a core component
of any understanding of environmental quality.
Kyu et al. (2018) provide the data for country-years’ DALY
rate.12 Our dependent variable follows Jahn (2016, 93) in
that we measure changes or progress in safe water use
and sanitation. That is, first, we calculated the average per
country-year of the two DALY rates (one for unsafe water
and the second one for unsafe sanitation) to arrive at a com-
bined value. Second, we follow the quotient rule of loga-
rithms and divide the current year’s value (t) by the previ-
ous year’s value (t−1) before calculating the logarithm. The
log-transformation accounts for the rate’s skewed distribu-
tion and outliers and we take the inverse of this. Ultimately,
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Figure 1 Environmental quality–water quality progress.
Note: Graph shows distribution of outcome variable for all countries and years in our sample.
the final dependent variable thus constitutes the inverse of
the subtracted logs of DALY rates due to unsafe water and
sanitation. It ranges between −0.112 and 0.201, with higher
values standing for more water-quality progress. In fact, neg-
ative values pertain to more life-years lost, while positive val-
ues are related to fewer life-years lost. Figure 1 outlines the
development of the dependent variable for all countries in
our observation period. The graph also shows that there is
low within country variation for some of our sample states.
We address concerns related to this in the Supporting In-
formation (SI) by jackknifing the sample and we explore
additional outcome variables for the analysis there.
In terms of the estimator, we rely on panel-corrected
standard-error models that comprise fixed effects for coun-
tries and region-years. Panel-level heteroskedastic errors ad-
dress country-specific idiosyncrasies and we specify that,
within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation with the
coefficient of this process being common to all panels. This
approach addresses measurement errors, assuming that the
error is “systematically related to the country, but does not
change much over time” (Neumayer 2003, 628). The fixed
effects allow us to control for any unobserved unit-level
effects as well as region-specific shocks in a given year. In
the SI, we consider modifications to this estimation strategy
and we discuss how it relates to a differences-in-differences
setup.
The main explanatory variable refers to the deployment
of UN peacekeeping troops. We focus on two different vari-
ants. First, using data from Di Salvatore (2019) who com-
piled the information from the International Peace Insti-
tute, we focus on a binary variable that receives a value of 1
in a given country-year if any peacekeepers are deployed (0
otherwise). In our sample, about 31 percent of all country-
years saw UN peace missions. Second, based on the same
source, we created a variable on the actual number of peace-
keepers per operation. To account for the skewed distribu-
tion of the original item, we log-transform it. Both variables
and all of the control variables that are discussed next are
temporally lagged by 1 year. Note the near consensus in the
literature that PKOs are not randomly assigned to countries,
but selected and deployed following very strategic and polit-
ical considerations (see Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti
2008; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014;
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Bove and Ruggeri 2019; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård
2019). Hence, next to analyzing the regular sample, we
also employed Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM; Blackwell
et al. 2009; Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) to pre-process the
data: this ensures that we obtain a sample that is virtually
identical in the control variables, but country-years differ in
whether they received the treatment, i.e., the deployment
of peacekeepers, or not. Eventually, CEM allows us to iden-
tify a causal influence stemming from UN interventions with
more precision.
The control variables are selected in light of a two-fold
rationale: they either affect the outcome variable, i.e., en-
vironmental quality, and thus are alternative mechanisms,
or they are related to the deployment of peacekeepers. The
latter then ensures that we control for a selection on ob-
servables or, when analyzing the matched data, address any
remaining imbalances between treated and control observa-
tions. To capture overall conflict dynamics, we include vari-
ables on civil-war casualties, ongoing ceasefires, the strength
of rebel groups, the presence of disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration (DDR) programs, and post-conflict
years. First, casualties refer to battle-related deaths and are
taken from Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg (2019). Battle-
related deaths are those caused by the warring parties that
can be directly related to combat. We focus on the best es-
timate for each conflict and modify the original data to fit
into the monadic, country-year format of our analysis. Sec-
ond, data on whether a country-year is a post-conflict year
or not and the information on the presence of ceasefires are
taken from Kreutz (2010). Both variables are binary. Third,
the strength of rebel groups is coded in an ordinal fash-
ion by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013). As the
original data focus on conflict episodes, we modified this
information as well to adjust for our unit of analysis. Finally,
whether a country has an ongoing DDR program is coded in
Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg (2019) and we consider a
dichotomous item for this.
Next to these variables, we also control for population,
income, and energy use. More populous countries may rep-
resent more difficult cases and, thus, are more likely to at-
tract peacekeepers. At the same time, population also corre-
lates with worse environmental quality (e.g., Caviglia-Harris,
Chambers, and Kahn 2009; Farzin and Bond 2006; Ward
2008; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt
2013; Jahn 2016; Böhmelt, Vaziri, and Ward 2018; Cao and
Ward 2015). In addition, the literature has thoroughly stud-
ied the relationship between income and environmental
outcomes. Some argue for the existence of an environmen-
tal Kuznets Curve, i.e., environmental quality first decreases
with income, but then improves once a tipping point has
been reached (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Selden and
Song 1994; Dasgupta et al. 2002). While it remains ambigu-
ous whether such a curve exists (e.g., Itkonen 2012) or what
functional form describes best the relationship between in-
come and environmental quality, we control for income us-
ing GDP per capita and allow for a curvilinear relationship
by including this item’s squared term. Data for both pop-
ulation and income are taken from Gleditsch (2002). Fi-
nally, using the World Bank Development Indicators, we
control for energy use, which is defined as “the use of pri-
mary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels.
This is equal to indigenous production plus imports and
stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships
and aircraft engaged in international transport.” The vari-
able is measured in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita
and is log-transformed. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive
statistics of all variables discussed.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Water quality progress 200 0.052 0.043 −0.112 0.201
Peacekeeping 200 0.305 0.462 0.000 1.000
Peacekeeping personnel 200 1.611 3.169 0.000 9.716
Conflict deaths 200 14.101 68.779 0.000 500.50
Ceasefire 200 0.460 0.500 0.000 1.000
Rebel strength 200 1.993 0.655 1.000 4.00
Population 200 9.632 1.254 6.377 11.870
GDP per capita 200 7.110 0.856 5.293 8.489
GDP per capita2 200 51.287 11.997 28.020 72.065
Energy use 200 5.789 0.745 2.256 7.051
DDR 200 0.070 0.256 0.000 1.000
Post conflict 200 0.555 0.498 0.000 1.000
Table 2. Peacekeeping and environmental quality













GDP per capita −0.020 −0.050
(0.121) (0.117)
GDP per capita2 0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.008)




Post conflict 0.011* 0.009
(0.007) (0.006)
Observations 200 200
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000
Notes: Constant included, but omitted from presentation. Standard er-
rors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
Empirical Findings
Table 2 presents our core models. The first estima-
tion concentrates on the binary variable peacekeeping, while
model 2 focuses on the actual troop numbers of UN inter-
ventions. All models comprise fixed effects for countries and
region-years. The coefficients can be directly interpreted
and we plot simulated marginal effects of the key explana-
tory variables in figure 2. We find strong and robust support
for our argument. Either when looking at mission alloca-
tions as such or actual mission size, the coefficient is pos-
itively signed across the models in table 2, which suggests
that peacekeeping is indeed linked to lowering the DALY
rate due to unsafe water and sanitation and, hence, better
environmental quality. For the first model, we obtain a coef-
ficient estimate of 0.023, which translates into an improve-
ment of 1.023 life-years per 100,000 persons for any UN mis-
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Figure 2 Peacekeeping and environmental quality: simulated marginal effects.
Note: Graph displays distribution of simulated marginal effects (N = 1,000 simulations); left panel pertains to model 1 where
grey dashed vertical line refers to marginal effect of 0 and grey solid vertical line stands for simulated mean marginal effect
(0.022); right panel pertains to model 2 where grey dashed vertical line refers to marginal effect of 0 and grey solid vertical
line stands for simulated mean marginal effect (0.004).
effect highlights that for a 10 percent increase in mission
size, we expect to see an improvement of about one life-year
per 100,000 persons. While the overall size of the reported
effects may not seem that substantive, recall that we focus on
a series of less-developed, African states with conflict experi-
ence. Hence, the total DALY rate is likely higher than, e.g.,
for industrialized Western countries, to begin with.
To assess the validity of the estimates for our core vari-
ables, we also simulate their marginal effects 1,000 times
using the method in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).
Figure 2 summarizes the results of this simulation exercise.
The left panel is based on model 1, where the mean value
of the simulated parameter is close to our estimation in
table 2 (0.022 here versus 0.023 in table 2). Moreover, out
of these 1,000 simulations, only a small share of about 2.3
percent is linked to a coefficient estimate of smaller than
or equal to 0. The right panel captures the distribution of
the simulated parameter for peacekeeping personnel and, thus,
is based on model 2. In this right panel, the mean simu-
lated marginal effect is 0.004, which is identical to our es-
timation in table 2. And out of the 1,000 simulated coeffi-
cients of peacekeeping personnel, only 0.5 percent are smaller
than or equal to 0. Hence, there is robust evidence across
the two simulations emphasizing that the impact of PKOs
on environmental quality, in fact, positive and statistically
significant.
Table 3 mirrors the specifications of model 1, but we
now rely on a pre-processed, matched sample to address
concerns about the non-random assignment of peacekeep-
ers. Following Di Salvatore (2019), we employ CEM and
match states based on pre-deployment levels of battle-
related deaths and state fragility. Matching on these two
variables maximizes the balance in the post-matched sam-
ple between treated and control cases. And, theoretically,
we address one of the most important drivers behind
peacekeepers’ self-selection, i.e., conflict intensity (e.g.,
Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Howard 2008;












GDP per capita −0.147
(0.124)









Country fixed effects Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes
Prob. > χ2 0.000
Notes: Constant included, but omitted from presentation. Standard er-
rors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014), while en-
suring that our results of changes in the DALY rate are
not driven by the (economic) collapse of the state. As de-
scribed by Di Salvatore (2019, 849), “CEM coarsens the sam-
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strata, weights balance the number of treated (with peace-
keeping) and untreated (without peacekeeping) observations
in each stratum. This alleviates selection bias and model de-
pendence.” The impact of peacekeeping in model 3 does not
differ much from earlier results as we still obtain a positive
and significant estimate for the coefficient. The overall sub-
stance is also similar to what we report in model 1. Link-
ing these results back to our theory, we find support for the
argument suggesting that peacekeeping leads to better en-
vironmental quality. Many mandates, UN bodies, and poli-
cies now comprise principles and activities that potentially
promote environmental quality. If effectively implemented
by peacekeepers, the environment does benefit from such
approaches.
In terms of the control variables, only rebel strength and post
conflict are associated with significant estimates, although
not fully consistent across models. First, stronger rebels are
linked to less progress in water quality and, indeed, in-
creases in the DALY rate. Second, in post-conflict periods,
progress in water quality are more strongly pronounced
than in active conflict years. The effect of post conflict is not
statistically significant in model 2, though. We do not ob-
tain evidence for a curvilinear relationship between GDP
per capita and environmental quality (e.g., Grossman and
Krueger 1995; Selden and Song 1994). Recall, however,
the ambiguity about the precise functional form between
income and environmental quality. More importantly, our
sample of countries does not comprise the full, global range
of national incomes, but focuses on a set of African states
that are less developed and characterized by lower incomes
than many other countries in the world.
In the SI, we assess the robustness of our core finding
by changing a variety of model specifications. Specifically,
table 1 of the SI additionally incorporates a temporally
lagged dependent variable to control for likely path de-
pendencies in the outcome. The impact of UN PKOs on
environmental quality remains statistically and substantially
significant. Second, we employ two alternative outcome vari-
ables to capture environmental quality. One of these alterna-
tives is based on research on the carbon efficiency frontier
(e.g., Böhmelt, Vaziri, and Ward 2018) (table 2 of the SI),
the other (table 3 of the SI) relies on forest degradation. We
further weigh the impact of PKOs by their “environmental
friendliness” at home (table 4 of the SI) and jackknife the
standard errors of the regression (table 5 of the SI). In
tables 6 and 7 of the SI, we implement two changes to the
sample: first, we focus on post-conflict periods of up to five
years only; second, we extend the lagged effect of UN mis-
sions to 5 years. In table 8 of the SI, we estimate a model that
also considers “green” PKO missions, i.e., those interven-
tions with environmental goals in their mandates. Finally,
we link our empirical setup to a differences-in-differences
design (table 9 of the SI). All these additional analyses
support our main result and the underlying theoretical
arguments.
Conclusion
Peacekeeping does keep peace. There is robust and consis-
tent evidence that UN peace missions are effective in restor-
ing security, lowering political violence, and protecting civil-
ians (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Gilligan
and Sergenti 2008; Howard 2008; Beardsley 2011; Kathman
and Wood 2011; Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2012; Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Autesserre 2014; Bove
and Ruggeri 2016, 2019; Haass and Ansorg 2018; Fjelde,
Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård
2019). While these impacts of peacekeepers have been rigor-
ously studied in the literature, scholars began only recently
to explore the less obvious side effects of PKOs.
We contribute to this latter series of works by examining
whether and how UN peacekeeping interventions promote
environmental quality in their host countries. Theoretically,
we have developed the argument that PKOs enhance envi-
ronmental quality in the host countries via three avenues:
the environmental goals formulated in mission mandates,
the cooperation with and activities of other UN bodies, and
the principles of general UN policies such as the “Declara-
tion of Shared Commitments.” The empirical evidence we
present, in the main analysis and in the SI, strongly and
robustly supports our theoretical expectations. We employ
quantitative data on water quality and peacekeeping mis-
sions in Africa between 1995 and 2012. When focusing on
the regular sample or the matched data set, which con-
trols for the likely non-random assignment of UN PKOs to
(post-) conflict countries, peacekeeping missions help mak-
ing progress regarding safe water access and sanitation.
The contribution of our work is, first and foremost, one
to the literature on PKOs and their externalities. Earlier re-
search finds that crime is also affected by UN peace missions
(Di Salvatore 2019), as are non-violent protests (Belgioioso,
Di Salvatore, and Pinckney 2021), women’s access to med-
ical services and education (Gizelis and Cao 2020), or the
economic well-being of households (Bove, Di Salvatore, and
Elia 2021). Our article underlines that another important,
but previously unknown implication is linked to UN PKOs,
namely, better environmental quality for host countries at
large. In light of this, there are several additional, cru-
cial consequences for other streams in the literature. On
one hand, there is the literature on environmental politics
and outcomes (e.g., Shafik 1994; Scruggs 1999; York, Rosa,
and Dietz 2003; Caviglia-Harris, Chambers, and Kahn 2009;
Farzin and Bond 2006; Ward 2008; Bernauer and Koubi
2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Jahn 2016; Böhmelt,
Vaziri, and Ward 2018). UN peace missions have not been
considered as a decisive factor in promoting environmen-
tal quality. Moreover, the works on “green peacekeepers”
(e.g., Maertens 2019) merely focus on the environmental
footprint of missions as such and have not explored that an
impact of PKOs on host nations as a whole is possible. We
address both of these aspects, shedding new light on what
drives environmental outcomes and clarifying that peace-
keepers’ environmental influence extends far beyond their
own mission’s footprint. On the other hand, climate change
is one of the most pressing policy issues of our time and it
has been linked to conflict, if only indirectly (Nordås, and
Gleditsch 2007; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2014; Theisen,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Buhaug et al. 2014; Mach et al.
2019). And PKOs may increasingly respond to conflict pre-
cipitated by climatic changes (Diehl 2018). However, re-
search suggests that conflict can be overcome by cooper-
ation over environmental projects (Conca et al. 2002; Ide
and Detges 2018; Ide 2019; Ide and Tubi 2020; Ide 2020;
Ide et al. 2021). We show that these two avenues are more
strongly linked to each other than scholars and policymak-
ers may have thought before: UN peace missions can im-
prove environmental quality, thereby inducing cooperation
over environmental projects; in turn, this is likely to lower
conflict risk as well—the primary goal of an UN interven-
tion. Moreover, the failure to respond to environmental
needs of war-torn societies could greatly complicate the diffi-
cult task of peacebuilding (Conca and Wallace 2009; Conca
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There are important policy implications following our
work and key avenues for future research. First, policymak-
ers require a better understanding of the (side) effects of
peacekeepers other than the direct promotion of peace and
security. This is necessary not only to fully make use of the
true potential of UN PKOs, but also to address any negative
implications early on (see, e.g., Ide 2020). Second, without
discarding the main goal of peacekeepers, environmental
aims and policies may warrant a more prominent role in
PKO mandates if their influence—as we show—is already
pronounced, but could be strengthened. Third, a poten-
tially important factor we cannot account for due to the lack
of data is the role of non-UN actors. Other organizations be-
sides the UN work in host countries and are probably likely
to produce positive externalities as well. For example, there
are QIPs implemented by non-governmental organizations
or aid agencies, which can be explicitly designed to edu-
cate about sustainability or improve environmental quality.
Finally, studying the moderating influences and scope con-
ditions could be a research area well worth pursuing. While
we explored one of those via our analysis on peacekeepers’
environmental behavior in their home countries (SI), many
others potentially exist.
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